Don’t Fix It If It Ain’t Broken

x Tomas Mandl

Michael Shifter is a Latin American policy pundit. These creatures, found in large numbers in Washington DC, usually play an important role in the government policy-making process. The traditional path that pundits follow to voice their opinion includes research for a think tank, work as ad-hoc policy advisers, regular media appearances, and, perhaps the most important of all, Congressional testimonies. Mr. Shifter works for the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank, and is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Presumably, he advises government officials both in the United States and in Latin America on a regular basis. Ergo, his opinion counts.

That is why I was disappointed to read his latest statement before Congress entitled "South America and the United States: How to Fix a Broken Relationship." In fact, the testimony’s gloomy title caught my attention and forced me to read the whole thing. My previous educated intuition indicated that although the United States-South America relations were far from ideal, it was much improved compared to, say, the last two hundred years. So, I read the whole thing and found myself disagreeing with almost everything Mr. Shifter said.

In the statement’s introduction, Shifter notes that “the strain and mistrust between Washington and most South American capitals has grown considerably over the past several years.” He backs this claim by recounting some of the latest discussions in the Organization of American States (OAS) such as the General Assembly in Panama and the 2005 election of its Secretary General. Mr. Shifter seems to suggest that because the South American countries did not agree 100 percent with the U.S. then something has to be broken. My own take on these events do not hint at any major “strain” or considerable “mistrust.” If anything, it reveals a mature relationship that yields unequal results based on specific interests and not on a fixed ideological premise.

According to Mr. Shifter three factors explain the broken state of the relationship. The first factor is, “the misguided policies the Bush administration has pursued towards the region.” For Shifter the main trouble is Washington’s lack of a, “coherent framework or vision” to conduct its South American policy. Now, one can agree or disagree with Mr. Bush’s policies in the region, but asking Mr. Bush to come up with a foreign policy “vision” is not helpful to the relationship. Although his administration has developed some interesting “visions”, its incompetence to implement them has been pervasive. Besides, with less than two years left until a new president moves to the White House, a fresh “vision” will have little impact.

However, the main trouble with Mr. Shifter’s “misguided policies“ line of attack is that it assumes a common “South American” voice and shared “South American” concerns. For instance, Mr. Shifter asserts that the region’s top three demands are, “greater attention to the region’s acute social agenda, reduced agricultural subsidies, and more liberal immigration laws.” On the contrary, these are not demands keenly shared by all the South American countries; the first one would benefit some countries, the second one would actually harm a few countries, and the third one would have no effect on most countries.

Indeed, in the last two years the Bush administration has finally learned to agree to disagree with the South American countries by focusing on common interests both at the bilateral and multilateral levels. For example, it has shown flexibility when negotiating trade agreements with the region. It negotiated free trade agreements with those South American countries willing to do so, negotiated a trade & investment protection agreement with others, and accepted Brazil’s reluctance to sign a free trade agreement of the Americas. Unlike other times in history, the current U.S. government put aside those major trade disagreements and pursued strategic agreements in other areas. Examples that stand out are ethanol collaboration with the Lula administration and the alliance with the Kirchner administration to prosecute former Iranian government officials accused of bombing Jewish organizations in Argentina.

The second and third factors that, according to Mr. Shifter explain the broken relationship, are due to the Bush administration’s “global policies, particularly in the Middle East” and changes “linked to globalization.” Whatever one may have to say about these two factors is clear that the Bush administration is not going to work on them just because they bother South American countries. It would be nice if any U.S. administration thought about the interest of the countries in the world before moving forward any “global policy.” In any case, the South American countries long ago got over the fact that the U.S. sometimes acts unilaterally. Therefore, they continue to work with the U.S. while expressing their disagreement whenever they can, as Chile did in the 2003 UN Security Council resolution before the invasion of Iraq. In the end, the South American governments might just need to understand globalization’s many layers and complexities, and grapple with the fact that globalization is not controlled by the U.S. government (thankfully).

Mr. Shifter concludes his statement with a number of reasonable recommendations that come down to being sympathetic towards South America. In addition, he requires the U.S. government to “devote more serious, sustained attention to the challenges in the region,” a proposition that would cause anxiety to many South American leaders (not including Chavez). Overall, Mr. Shifter’s testimony conveys the implicit message that South American governments yearn for U.S. government attention. My impression is that most South American countries, once they sign a trade deal, just want to be left alone. If history has taught them anything is that too much love coming from the north can be perilous.

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